“Experts”* put too much stock in that stupid win statistic.

Padre pitcher Greg Maddux has allowed 2 or fewer earned runs in 8 of his previous 10 starts, without earning a W.

Maddux’s streak of pitching well without earning a “win” to show for it isn’t illustrative of “bad luck” without support from the offense.  The streak is a perfect, right in your face example of why the “win” is a garbage.  It does not adequately measure a pitcher’s ability.  A starting pitcher is, at best, responsible for 50%** of earning a win.

The stat enjoys entirely too much credence with the mainstream media, who continues to recite the same meaningless rhetoric about the win.  The Padres (or whatever team) need to “step it up” on offense to support their pitcher.

Whatever that means.  Somehow it is the offense’s responsibility to earn the pitcher credit for a good performance?  Come on, experts.  Does that make any sense at all?  This is the best you can do?

Just stop with the wins. They force you to make crazy ass-backwards assertions to avoid admitting a mistake.

* I don’t mean to pick on Krasovic here.  I enjoy him more than other columnists / pundits.

** Sorry, I made this number up.  The real answer could easily be 60% or 40%.  The point still stands.

photo credit: SD Dirk

On June 22, San Diego Union Tribune writer Tom Krasovic published an article covering the year long ineptitude of the San Diego Padres.  Of course, any writer could find evidence of this printed on a bottle of baby powder, the way the team’s poor play slaps viewers across the face.

Unfortunately Krasovic chose to stretch the limits of traditional statistical analysis by addressing the rather infamous topic of hitting with runners in scoring position.  To throw fuel on the fire, he mixes that with some hot strikeout hating action.

Compared with the National League average, [the Padres] are 13 percent more likely to strike out with a man in scoring position.

One short line, no big deal, right?  The problem, is he is dead wrong.

Tom Krasovic is the UT’s expert. He misinformed readers who trust him to teach important statistical concepts and instruct fans about the game.

Strikeouts

We’ve covered the strikeout controversy already.  Mark Grant’s criticism prompted a post that ranks 2007 teams by total strikeouts.  We found that more playoff teams were actually in the top half of the league in strikeouts rather than the bottom.  One reason is because striking out is often an essential ingredient to hitting for power.  Big guys have to swing hard.  And sometimes, you miss hard.  (Have “that’s what she said” jokes gone out of style again yet?)

Another reason strikeouts don’t keep good teams from winning is that with runners on base, a strikeout is not the worst a batter can do.  That honor belongs to hitting into a double play.  And the double play, believe it or not, has never happened off a strikeout.  Strike-em-out throw-em-outs don’t count.  Because I say so.

With runners in scoring position

Every study I have ever seen on “clutch hitting” comes to the same conclusion: there is no such thing.  Allow me to take a small page from these studies and present a comparison.

There is clear evidence that the Padres strike out less with runners in scoring position, not more.

It does appear that striking out less with RISP is normal.  And while they may strikeout more than the league average in general, don’t complain to the 2007 Diamondbacks, Indians, or Phillies.  Those teams struck out the third, sixth, and seventh most in all the majors last year, you can see how shitty things turned out for them.  They all made the playoffs.

Conclusion

Krasovic’s data may be factually correct, but it signifies very little about the Padres hitting ability.  Which is odd, because you don’t have to look hard to see how bad the team has been.

I sent Tom an email to clarify what he meant by the statement. It is indeed his contention is that a higher strikeout rate with runners in scoring position is in fact an example of poor hitting, which just isn’t the case.  Readers who depend on sportswriters to provide accurate information deserve better.

As Brother Melvin already filled us in, Chase Headley, the God third baseman has arrived. After two games, he’s hitting .375 (wait, who cares?) with a home run. Not bad. And while he spelled Kevin Kouzmanoff at third base tonight, he made his left field debut last night. He made an error, but it was likely the first night of many that we’ll see Headley patrolling the area opposite Jody Gerut.

Left field has been manned by five different outfielders this season. Scott Hairston, Justin Huber and Paul McAnulty have spent the most time in left, although Huber is now in Portland. The survivors, Hairston and McA, will likely see their playing time decrease with Headley in San Diego.

Where have they set the bar for the Tennessee Stud?

Overall, as of last Friday, the Padres left field as a whole produced an OPS of .759. McAnulty is leading this charge with a .913 OPS. He’s second in at-bats to Hairston, who has an OPS in left field of .666. Huber is at .569, for good measure.

Clearly, Headley has come to save us from the horrors that are Scott Hairston and Justin Huber. What this means for McAnulty, though, might be scarier.

Hairston is sticking around. He’s the only player on the team that can back up Gerut in center, and he still has goodwill leftover from those walk off jobs he hit last season. With Huber wearing Beaver blue, that leaves McA on the bench. Despite his defensive deficiencies, another blast was added to the “high”light reel tonight. One would hope that he’ll stick around given his superior hitting: an overall OPS+ of 110 is fourth on the team for players with 100 at-bats. But barring an injury somewhere, it would seem doubtful that McAnulty will find decent at-bats in the near future, which might not be best for the Padres.

(DC and Brother Preston contributed to this article)

Barring some amazing turn of events, Adrian Gonzalez is making this year’s All-Star team. With R. II (Lance Berkman) having an amazing season, it’s doubtful that Adrian will crack the starting nine, but he’ll be there. There’s no question about that. Which is good, because it leaves us more time to question whether or not he should take part in the Home Run Derby.

The Home Run Derby, while becoming increasingly irrelevant, is a staple of the All-Star beginning-of-the-week. In recent years, however, it has started to become infamous. Not because the league has cheapened it by forcing players into ugly souvenirs as opposed to the usual team representation, but because it seems that participating in the Derby drains the participate of their power. In 2005, Bobby Abreu came into the Derby with 18 home runs and a .526 SLG. After he hit a record setting 24 home runs on that fateful Monday night, he hit 6 home runs with .411 SLG in the second half.

But is there a correlation?

24 participants took part in the Home Run Derby from 2004 through 2006. I have decided not to include participants in the 2007 Derby because without knowing how their 2008 seasons play out, we can’t know their full stories. Of the 24, exactly half, 12 players, saw their SLG go up in the second half of the season. Of the remaining 12, three players saw only a minor drop in their SLG over the course of the next 81 games, leaving us with 9 players who saw their numbers dip substantially.

Of those nine, only three players (David Wright, Jim Thome, Sammy Sosa) have a career SLG over .500. To be fair, Carlos Lee and the aforementioned Bobby Abreu are stuck at .499, so we’ll group them in. Those are five legitimate power hitters who saw their numbers fail. Of the other four, Jermaine Dye, Miguel Tejada and Hank Blalock saw their SLG drift down closer to their career marks, while Ivan Rodriguez has seen his power drop consistently over the course of the past four seasons. This leaves us with Wright, Thome and Sosa.

Let’s start with Sosa (2004), who took part during his final season with the Cubs. Not only did his SLG drop from the first half of 2004 to the second half of 2004, but it kept dropping into the first and second half of 2005. He then sat the 2006 season out before coming back and hitting for good power with the Texas Rangers in 2007. Given his steady decline, and participation in four of the previous five Derbies, I think it’s safe to say that the Home Run Derby was not responsible for his drop in production.

Jim Thome (2004), like Sosa, is no stranger to Home Run Derbies, having participated in three in his career. Thome saw his SLG drop from .653 to .484. Again, like Sosa, Thome saw his numbers continue to drop into the next season, down to .352 in the first half of 2005 before surgery cost him the second half. Once again, as with Sosa, I think it’s safe to say that the Home Run Derby was not responsible for Thome’s drop in production.

David Wright (2006) has neither age nor injury to blame for his drop. He hit 20 home runs before and only 6 after. His average and OBP dropped .011 points while his SLG dropped .106. This would seem to be our first piece of evidence that the Home Run Derby can affect a player’s power, as it didn’t do anything to any other part of Wright’s game. Making things worse is Wright’s improvement in 2005, the year before, and 2007, the year after.

Carlos Lee (2005), like Wright, saw a minor drop in his batting average, from .268 to .262 while his SLG dropped from .528 to .437. For good measure, his OBP dropped 27 points as well. From 2002 through 2004, Lee actually saw a significant rise in his SLG after the break, from the mid .400s to the upper .500s. In 2004, the year before, he went from .463 to .599. In 2005, though, things started to change. He began to SLG in the .500s in the first half. However, in 2006 and 2007, he managed to keep it in the .500s over the course of the second half. So I’m going to go ahead and present Lee as our second piece of evidence.

Finally, we come to Bobby Abreu (2005). The poster boy. In 2002, three seasons before he made history, he saw his SLG rise from .486 to .556. In 2003, two seasons before, he saw his SLG sort of rise from .461 to .478. Unlike 2002, though, Abreu saw his home run numbers drop, from 14 to 6, as well as his IsoP, from .187 to .143. And in 2004, one season before, he saw his SLG go from .569 to .515, his home runs drop from 18 to 12, and his IsoP to drop from .263 to .219. Looking at this context, it makes a person wonder why there was such a shock. Granted, during the season in question, his SLG alone dropped .115 points. From the first half of 2006 through the 2007 All-Star break, his SLG continued to drop, starting at .467 and falling to .456 and .372. In the second half of 2007, he slugged .528 but he’s evened out now with a SLG of .463. And for what it’s worth, in 2005, his walk rate dropped while his strike out rate went up.

By my calculations, of the past 24 participates of the Home Run Derby, only two players would seem to have a legitimate claim that it adversely affected their power: David Wright and Carlos Lee.

What does this mean for Adrian Gonzalez?

As of the writing of this article, his SLG rests at .565 and his IsoP at .268. His previous season high was last season’s .502 and his career splits see his SLG rise from .490 to .513 after the break. Funnily enough, according to Baseball Reference, Adrian’s fourth most similar batter is Justin Morneau, who took part in the Derby last season. For perspective, coming off his MVP season, Morneau slugged .581 in the first half, winning himself a spot in the competition. Following it, he slugged .384 till the end. The previous season, his SLG did drop but only .056 points. In 05, it dropped .080 points. On his career, his SLG has dropped .069 points after the break.

Should we let Adrian play? I say “Yes.” He’s shown an aptitude for improving as the season goes on, which is a good starting point. And since it would appear that only 8% of the 2004-2006 participants saw a potential Home Run Derby caused decrease in production, the odds are in the favor. The Morneau comparison does show some cause for concern, but not enough in light of everything else.

In honor of Padres broadcaster Mark Grant’s criticism of the Padres’ high strikeout totals during the pre-game show and during play today, I submit for your review the following table courtesy of ESPN.
For informational and entertainment purposes, teams who made the playoffs have been highlighted.  Anyone see a trend here?  Because I sure don’t, and I’d love to hear Grant’s explanation:

Granted, high strikeout numbers aren’t a particularly good thing.  But in the grand scheme of performance indicators they don’t mean a team isn’t playing well.

Further in his analysis, Grant goes on to advise hitters to shorten up their swings to put more balls into play.  This plan will likely lower strikeout totals.  The downside though, and this is a biggie, is it effectively eliminates power.  I’d love to hear that conversation between he and Ryan Howard or Dan Uggla on the horrendous problem of strikeouts and why they need a new approach.

edit 5/18: Ray suggested I take a look at changes in hitting on two strike counts. The idea is that hitters often take the Grant’s suggested approach with two strikes on them. Batters shorten their swing to “protect the plate”, or avoid the strikeout. We can use this situation to imitate how slugging shapes up under Grant’s recommendation .  Here’s the “pass through” count data from 2006 courtesy of Tom Tango:

This simple analysis shows that when hitters (presumably) shorten their swing with two strikes, even with full counts, their power deteriorates significantly.  It should also be mentioned that hitters’ OBP and wOBA drop way down with two strikes on the batter.

*This is 2006 median, not mean, slugging

In the top of the sixth during the Padres-Braves match up tonight, Matt Vasgersian and Mark Grant were discussing Padres 2008 second baseman Tadahito Iguchi and his hitting troubles this year.

Vasgersian, using Iguchi’s single on a 3-2 count as an example, proclaimed that Iguchi’s key to hitting success, along with the key of many others in the game, is to work the count.  Let me say that you’re not going to get much of an argument from me about that.  Working the count and taking walks are an important part of not making outs, which in turn is important to winning ballgames.  However, a quick check of Baseball-Reference.com shows some amusing numbers:

Pitches per plate appearance of course are the most elemental aspect of “working the count”.

30 seconds.  30 seconds is how long it took me to fire up B-R and check if the facts support a theory.  It probably would have been faster if I spelled Iguchi’s name right my first try.

This is more than just one event

I don’t want to hang this one on just Vasgersian and Grant.  The segment sounded like it came from a producer.  Reason being that when the subject was introduced, a quick recap video of Iguchi’s previous plate appearance was cued up and ready to go.  It’s just a guess from me, but the whole segment seemed a bit polished to be just Vasgersian rambling to kill time.  (If it didn’t come from a producer, then I’ll admit that changes things.  I don’t expect the play-by-play guy to check b-r for every off the cuff remark on a live broadcast, I know it’s a hard enough job.)

This gaffe represents the Padres’ broadcasting crew, run by Cox communications, and their poor regard for the proper use of statistics.  Statistical sampling issues, among others, abound on nearly every broadcast.  Arbitrary constraints are thrown in to samples sizes which apparently make the information “interesting”, but end up being misleading and not at all helpful to the fan’s understanding of the game.  The number of outs made on Tuesdays that Brian Giles tans before the game are what we end up hearing about, and it sucks.

Things may not get better.  Producer Ed Barnes had this to say regarding statistics recently, courtesy of the Union Tribune:

“I don’t want it to be wall-to-wall stats,” he said. “I’m not the guy who’s going to be introducing EqA – equivalent average – to the show or something like that. . . . If we can find a way to put a nice bow on something and provide a nice context, then I don’t think a new stat is necessarily a bad thing. But we are not going to be scanning ‘Baseball Prospectus’ from this year and putting that on the air.”

This isn’t what I’m asking for, wall to wall nerdiness.  Except maybe equivalent average, I am asking for that.  Because it’s easy, and it includes a buttload more information than just hits divided by at-bats.  Plus it’s set to the scale of batting average, so .260 is about average and .320 is very good.  That doesn’t sound too terrible does it?

What I am asking for, is a little responsibility.  Spend 30 freaking seconds on Iguchi’s pitches per plate appearances, even less time if you can spell.  Don’t needlessly limit sample size “for fun” without telling people that doing so totally craps up the data.  Times are changing.  It’s funny that it the improvement on the subject had to happen from the bottom up.  It’s time for those with all the resources to respond to the innovations made by those who don’t.

Anyway, this kind of turned into a rant.  I’m only halfway sorry about that.

PS: I still love you Matt Vasgersian.

Statistical sampling and the nature of the game of baseball are two concepts that make this sport frustrating to follow.  There are so many variables that account for teams playing either above or below expected levels.

Dramatic scenes such as the Rockies come back from the dead last year is an exhilarating, rip-roaing good time. On the flip side, under performance is a difficult, distressing, process. Like a crash on a crank binge, we’re feeling the downside right now and it is not much fun.

We know the Padres are a better team than the way they’re producing.  Nobody predicted 95 wins, but a last place team this is not

External Factors

Phantom over at Gaslamp Ball takes a closer look at the pitching we’ve faced, and the parks in which we’ve played.

First off, he averaged the ERA+ of starters each NL west team drew so far.  However, if we want to determine the ability of pitchers faced without involving our own play, this may not be the best idea.  If a pitcher we’ve faced more often has a high ERA+ this early in the season, it could easily be due to our own crapulence rather than the ability of the pitcher.

That said, he gives us the names of pitchers we’ve faced twice, and we know based on their history they’re good players.  This left us at a disadvantage.

Phantom’s second subject, analyzing the park effects of our games, is an important consideration when looking at raw numbers.  Our boys in blue sport a .234 / .302 / .336 line so far this season, which looks bleak compared to .251 / .322 / .411 last year.  I’ll use my own method in this analysis, and take the easy route with OPS+which adjusts for ballparks for me.*

Last year’s Padres OPS+ was 101, reflecting poorly on those who think the team’s offense was below average.  This year’s club sports an OPS+ of 79 which reflects poorly on the offense itself.

What about Runs?

Baseball Prospectus uses a modified version of the Pythagorian run equation (dubbed Pythagenport) to a team’s expected wins.  This is a method of removing luck when judging wins and losses.

They take the number of runs scored versus runs allowed, and adjust it according to variances in the teams’ batting line.  Then they adjust to the quality of the hitting and pitching abilities of opponents played to determine “adjusted equivalent runs scored” and “adjusted equivalent runs allowed” (AEqR and AEqRA) .*  Their calculations suggest we have played slightly unlucky in these regards, but not of enough significance to much yowsers in my trousers.

*By the way, those asterisks are there because data like park factors and opposing team adjustments need more innings before they can be relied on.  That’s a good thing though, it gives our boys more opportunity to bounce back.

Matt and Mud were wondering on the air today about a batter’s propensity to foul pitches off on full counts.  Baseball-Reference PI can calculate by player, unfortunately I don’t know how to do it inclusively.  Individually, the contact percentage in my informal study seems to vary wildly by player and batting count.

I’ll take this opportunity to ignore their question and talk about something I find more important: expected outcome by count.  Tango has some work on the subject.

Expected outcome at 3-2 count:

Think of wOBA as something like OPS, an all inclusive type stat but set to the scale as OBP.  So .340 would be about average, etc.

The predicted outcome of wOBA and OBP on a 3-2 count makes sense inherently.  A batter won’t be as productive overall with fewer than three balls, and will be more productive with 3 balls and fewer strikes.

What strikes me as odd, is the slugging drop off on a 3-2 count compared to 2-1, or even a 1-0 count.  You’ll have to click over to Tango’s site to see the entire table.

My thinking is that hitters are so asked to attempt to make any kind of contact (protect the plate) with two strikes.  This means they’re more likely to just toss the bat in front of the pitch, even with 3 balls and a walk imminent.  Hitters face a seemingly irrational scorn for looking at strike three, which appears especially strange on full counts.  This may correlate with Matt and Mud’s theory of more foul balls on counts that are full.

One note from Tom Tippett: be careful to differentiate between the “through” count data with the “at” count data.  The advantages to hitter friendly counts and disadvantages to pitcher friendly counts are skewed all funky like unless you look at the “through” count data.  Otherwise the context and meaning of the rest of the at bat is lost.

Tough loss today for the Padres.  On the plus side, Brian Giles is off to a fantastic start.

The first full day of Major League Baseball in the year two-thousand and eight has come to a close. What have we learned?

If the Padres only thought about acquiring you, you’re good.

While my guy Hollywood Jim went hitless today (.000/.000/.000) and didn’t even get in the game, some of the names bandied about before he joined the team did okay for themselves:

Kosuke Fukudome went three for three with a walk, a home run, and three RBI. The home run came in the bottom of the ninth with two runners on and the Cubs down by three. If it wasn’t for Tony “Asshole” Gwynn, Jr., he would’ve been the hero in Chicagoland. But T2 came through in the clutch.

Nate McClouth went three for five with a walk, a home run, and four RBI. Although he did make a crucial fielding gaffe that allowed the Braves to come back and tie the game in the ninth. But the Pirates did come back, so it’s all good.

Luke Scott went one for three.

TSB’s guy, Milton Bradley, went oh for two with two walks. A .500 OBP. That guy just finds a way.

Scott Hairston, starting center fielder during tonight’s Astros/Padres competition, went oh for four. But Garfield did go two for three with a walk. He might not have been in the lineup without the Living Legend in center, so that’ll do.

Read more >> Options >>

Headley is optioned to Portland, reports Corey Brock of Padres.com.

Yeah, he tore it up in Spring Training.  Most notable is his successful switch to left field. At the dish? They’re spring training stats. The thing about spring training stats is, the front office, much like myself, doesn’t put too much stock in them as predictors.

Here’s why: The competition in March isn’t equivalent to the majors. Pitchers generally work on delivery, control, or experiment with pitches, techniques, etc.  Top position playing starters don’t always start, which lowers the defense abilities below what you’d face in the majors.

Perhaps most importantly, the 50 or so (at best) plate appearances participants see is hardly enough to draw any significant conclusions about ability.

Spring training is a time to rely on observational analysis in the field, the readiness of a player on a personal level, and other front office considerations

In today’s game, the roll of a scout in personnel decisions is diminishing. This is one of those opportunities (See, I’ll admit they exist) where a decision made from a traditional scouting perspective is most appropriate.

I’ll admit that of all the options in left field, the most exciting option is  starting Chase Headley on March 31st. Without even checking with me however, Padre brass decided the long term interest of the ball club needs Headley starting the season in Portland.  Considering his cup of coffee with the team last June, we know the front office has no qualms with letting him loose when the time is right.

Looks like Wade LeBlanc made a late come back in our prospect poll on the right there.  Agree or disagree on the prospect ranking?  Let us know in the poll.  Agree or disagree with my thoughts?  Let us know in the comments. PS– Sorry about the lack of jokes today.  More foreskin humor to come, I promise.